The Indo-Pacific is not Europe. Not all states agree there is a common adversary, there is no formal alliance structure, and the institutional mechanisms that make NATO rearmament both credible and coherent, doesn’t exist.
U.S. foreign policy and its lack of predictability now looks dangerous for South Korea—and that’s without considering the second and third-order effects.
U.S. soft power is disappearing faster than a bouffant comb-over on a windy day - and in Seoul the winds are blowing hard.
Geography is more than a backdrop—it often shapes the grand arcs of national strategy. While political will, technology, ideology, and the vagaries of fortune do override geography, it is always momentary. Like the rocks and earth on which it rests, geography tells tales over millenia, not centuries or decades.
At the moment, it’s impossible to escape. The parade of think tank briefs, university reports, blog posts, and earnest social media threads is already in full swing. After all, the moment seems irresistible — a relatively new U.S. president and a freshly minted South Korean one.
It was inevitable. Like watching porn in tracksuit pants, America’s left-leaning commentators can’t hide their fondness for Lee Jae-myung. A plucky human rights lawyer who survived child labor in a factory; a human rights lawyer; and someone who stared down authoritarianism at the barricades. It’s classic Western leftist fetishism—a script-ready narrative for a Michael Moore documentary. Unfortunately, this sentimental packaging misunderstands both Lee and Korea.
In South Korea, there’s an old leftist argument that the foreign policy of the country was long ago captured. It draws a straight line from the chinilpa - Koreans who collaborated with Japanese colonial rule - to the postwar conservative elites who aligned the country’s strategy with U.S. interests.
The passing of Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, Henry Kissinger, and just under ten years ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski, marks more than just the end of an era of iconic U.S. foreign policy thinkers. It symbolizes a broader intellectual shift.
It is a strange time to be a thinktank policy analyst in Washington. On one hand, the policy papers keep coming—well-researched, sober, often sensible attempts to offer realistic paths forward on North Korea and the ROKUS alliance.
Trump just said out loud what had been true for seventy years: The alliance was always for sale. It was always a transaction. The challenge now is ensuring that it is a valuable transaction - and this is where Trump will fail.
