Sould secured a 15% cap on tariffs but look closer, and the foundation crumbles. There is no signed agreement. No formal declaration. No U.S. legal record. And already, the two sides are offering conflicting interpretations of what, exactly, was agreed to.
Two pieces put out this week invited scorn. The first, “South Korea’s special envoys for… what exactly???”, used diplomatic tradition to criticize the sending of special envoys at the beginning of a presidential administration, invited praise from the right, and anger from the left. The second, “The challenges to Korean conservatism”, used American debates and local knowledge to criticize the ongoing failure to reform the conservative movement in Korea, invited praise from the left and anger from the right. I’m a born charmer.
Diplomacy is dead. Where it stood now sits political grift, ego, and Big Mac burger wrappers.
Every discussion about South Korea’s foreign policy options begins with the same unspoken constraint: what will Washington tolerate? Proposals for strategic realignment, closer ties with China, or regional multilateralism are not dismissed because they’re impossible—they’re dismissed because they’re implausible within the context of U.S. political expectations.
In South Korea, there’s an old leftist argument that the foreign policy of the country was long ago captured. It draws a straight line from the chinilpa - Koreans who collaborated with Japanese colonial rule - to the postwar conservative elites who aligned the country’s strategy with U.S. interests.
Significance. Observers consistently make the mistake of assessing South Korea’s foreign policy trajectory based on campaign rhetoric and election-period positioning.
Yoon has left the building - but what happens to his foreign policy ideas? What happens to closer South Korea - U.S. relations, closer South Korea - Japan relations, and closer trilateral relations?
The Trump Administration’s DOGE is a bull in the international relations China shop. It’s taken a wrecking ball to USAID, RFA, VOA, the Wilson Center and USIP - institutions of international relations that most of us grew up with and held to be inviolable.
Middle powers do not have the capacity to shape changes in the strategic environment; rather, they react to them. What distinguishes them from smaller powers is their capacity to plan how to react in anticipation of change. If they’re lucky, reaction is planned in advance and they secure advantage.
Spending time in Seoul’s epistemic community—among journalists, academics, and policymakers—I’m often struck by how rarely Australia is seen as an independent actor in international affairs. When discussing regional security, trade policy, or strategic alliances, Australia is routinely framed as an extension of the United States - often an annoying and arrogant extension.
