An international Commission on the Korean Peninsula
For decades, diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula has been trapped in a rigid and repetitive cycle, largely shaped by the strategic interests of others. American security priorities, Chinese strategic concerns, Russian opportunism, and Japanese anxieties have each carved deep grooves into how the world thinks about Korea.
Meanwhile, Koreans—both North and South—have too often been secondary actors. Too weak, too uninfluential, too restrained, too divided, and too undeveloped. The opportunities to be heard were just not there. This is rapidly changing. There is today space for Korean interests, Korean security, and Korean aspirations to sit at the center of the diplomatic conversation.
An international commission on the Korean Peninsula offers exactly this opportunity. Unlike the endless rounds of crisis diplomacy, which only manage immediate tensions without addressing underlying structures, an international commission would allow Korea to reframe the fundamental questions of peace and security on the peninsula. Rather than being forced to react to the interests of others, Korea could set the agenda.
International commissions are, in fact, the epitome of classical middle power diplomacy. They rely on creativity to propose solutions outside the rigid confines of great power negotiations. They engage NGOs, academics, corporations, and civil society to broaden the base of diplomatic influence. They require sophisticated coalition building among like-minded states to create critical mass behind new ideas. And they demand skillful diplomacy—both public and private—to navigate resistance and skepticism.
For a country like South Korea, which has long possessed the diplomatic talent, international reputation, and institutional capabilities characteristic of a leading middle power, an international commission is the natural instrument to magnify national interests without provoking direct confrontation with larger powers.
Currently, thinking about the Korean Peninsula remains stuck within tired frameworks: denuclearization at any cost, the false binary of maximum pressure or unconditional engagement, the view of North Korea only as a threat to be neutralized rather than a neighbor to be engaged and eventually reconciled. These frameworks serve the immediate interests of others, but they do not serve Korea’s long-term strategic needs. Korea requires stability, peaceful coexistence, progressive threat reduction, and eventually—on its own terms—reconciliation. An international commission would create space to pursue these goals beyond the suffocating shadow of external powers.
By designing and sponsoring an international commission, South Korea would elevate its status as a diplomatic leader, not a subordinate partner. It would place Korean priorities—stability, coexistence, development, and eventual unification—at the heart of global conversations. It would allow Koreans to articulate their future, rather than have it continually dictated by external great powers with conflicting agendas.
Moreover, the process itself would bring much-needed creativity and flexibility. Through expert consultations, public forums, commissioned research, and active international engagement, an international commission could explore innovative approaches often excluded from traditional negotiations. It could examine new confidence-building measures, regional security architectures, economic reintegration pathways, transitional justice mechanisms, and post-conflict governance models—none of which receive serious attention when discussions are dominated by nuclear weapon counts or troop deployments.
Importantly, an international commission would not simply be a collection of ideas; it would create a durable reference point for future diplomacy. A credible, comprehensive, and imaginative report would become a foundation for policymaking well beyond the immediate political cycles in Seoul, Washington, or elsewhere. It would provide successive Korean governments with a coherent framework for diplomacy that reflects Korean interests consistently, regardless of international or domestic political shifts.
Of course, there are risks. Major powers would resist a Korean-led initiative. The U.S. does not want to lose its influence. The Japanese do not want change. The Chinese are happy to wait until the Americans are far enough away, and the Russians don’t really care, but to annoy the Americans. Let’s face it, when you’re a middle power you have no chance to persuade any one of these powers, let alone all of them.
Some may fear losing control over the narrative. Others may try to co-opt or undermine the effort. But if carefully designed—through coalition-building with other respected middle powers, transparent processes, and careful diplomatic messaging—a Korean-sponsored international commission could enhance legitimacy, not provoke confrontation. Coalition building starts with “like-minded partners” - perhaps Sweden, Denmark, Indonesia, or Finland; it then adds actors that would help build momentum - perhaps Australia, Canada, Spain, or India; then it finally uses this momentum to get the support of the weakest link in great power obstinacy, perhaps Japan or Russia? It steadily builds an inclusive platform, not a unilateral imposition. In doing so, Korea would demonstrate its maturity, vision, and leadership as a global actor.
Korea has never done this before. Through convention, every diplomatic step has been undertaken through the U.S. Even the Sunshine Policy, developed outside the auspices of U.S. diplomatic planning, was then built not with other like-minded middle powers, but rather directly with the U.S. Between the obstinacy of North Korea and the U.S., the Sunshine Policy never really never had a chance.
The diplomatic environment today offers a narrow but real window of opportunity. Security tensions on the Peninsula are low by historical standards. International focus on Korea remains high, but policy solutions remain elusive. Domestically, there is a growing realization that reliance on foreign strategies alone has failed to secure lasting peace. Now is the time to act.
The alternative is grim: continued subordination to the tactical needs of Washington, the strategic calculations of Beijing, the opportunistic maneuvering of Moscow, and the cautious hedging of Tokyo. If Korea does not seize the initiative to redefine the conversation, others will continue to do so—and Korean interests will again be an afterthought in their larger strategic games.
An international commission is not a panacea. It is, however, a critical tool to break free from the paralyzing repetition of past failures. It is a way to plant new ideas, to nurture new frameworks, and to assert Korean agency in shaping the Peninsula’s future. If South Korea wishes to be the master of its own destiny rather than the object of other powers’ calculations, leading the establishment of an international commission is not just an option—it is a strategic imperative.
